
Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) are a mixed bag. It is therefore important to separate the wheat (truly anomalous) from the chaff (human-made technologies). Let us illustrate this challenge in the context of orbs.
The mysterious orbs mentioned in the records of the Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters (PURSUE) here, have the following physical properties:
1. Size: of order 1 meter.
2. Speed: 100–600 meters per second, between 0.3 and 1.7 times the speed of sound, as reported in videos from the Gulf of Oman, available here, here, here and here.
3. Thermal Signature: The orbs appear cold on infrared sensors, meaning they register as colder than background on thermal imagery, the opposite of what one might expect from any combustion-based propulsion or from aerodynamic heating at the reported speeds.
4. Radar Cross-Section: some orbs are independently tracked by multiple radar systems while others appear to have been characterized primarily via optical/infrared sensor data rather than confirmed radar returns. Note that infrared-only detections are more vulnerable to sensor artifacts, lens flare, and out-of-focus point sources than radar-confirmed contacts.
5. Color and Visual Appearance: Reports span black, white, and unspecified metallic/reflective appearances.
6. Coordinated Behavior: Formation flying.
7. Apparent reactivity to aircraft firing its main cannon in the Gulf of Oman incident.
8. No visible propulsion, exhaust, or control surfaces.
9. Transmedium behavior: Air-water transition capability was documented in some cases.
The following properties fit conventional drones:
1. Size: The inferred dimension is squarely in the range of fielded small quadcopter or multirotor drones used for both commercial and military applications.
2. No visible propulsion, exhaust, or control surfaces: Small electric multirotor drones have no exhaust plume and their rotors are often too small and fast-spinning to resolve on standard military infrared or handheld camera footage.
3. Coordinated behavior: This is common technology of fielded drone swarms, either pre-programmed or centrally piloted, which is likely deployed in the Gulf of Oman where several such incidents occurred.
4. Apparent reactivity: Response to weapons fire is fully explicable by a remotely piloted or sensor-equipped drone. A human or AI operator or onboard threat-detection system responding to being shot at (visually, acoustically, or via radar-warning-type sensing) is unremarkable. This is precisely the kind of evasive behavior military drones are designed to exhibit. The concentration of reports in active conflict zones, such as the Gulf of Oman, Bagram in Afghanistan or U.S. Central Command, is expected if these are adversary drones rather than a phenomenon indifferent to human geopolitics. A genuinely exotic or natural phenomenon has no reason to cluster around the most heavily-instrumented, most militarily contested airspace on Earth.
5. Transmedium behavior: Experimental and fielded transmedium drones (labeled as UUV-UAS hybrid programs) exist (as discussed, for example, here). They include Chinese research into craft that can transition between air and water (as discussed here and here).
However, the drone interpretation is strained by the following properties:
1. Speed: The Gulf of Oman orbs reach sustained supersonic speeds which is not currently possible for small, rotor-based or ducted-fan drones. The aerodynamics and propulsion requirements for a multirotor-type craft at that speed are not remotely compatible with known small-drone engineering. If the high end of that speed range is accurate and correctly attributed to the same small objects rather than reflecting a measurement error, sensor artifact, or conflation with a separate fast-moving object like a missile in the same scene, this genuinely exceeds what any known drone technology, small or large, can do.
2. Thermal signature: Small electric drones typically do show a modest but detectable thermal signature from motors, batteries, and electronics and should not appear as cold orbs. Appearing cold relative to background is unusual for an active, powered device, although it might reflect a novel drone design which evades a thermal fingerprint given the distance and sensor sensitivity threshold.
3. Radar Cross-Section: Small drones, especially plastic/composite-bodied commercial ones, notoriously have very low radar cross-sections. This could explain why some orb incidents lack solid radar confirmation, but it suggests that other objects which were tracked on radar with a strong return, are different.
The most likely resolution for the mixed message in the above analysis is that not a single explanation covers all reported orbs. It is plausible that the majority of the low-speed, formation-flying, radar-quiet orbs are genuinely human-made drones, while the outlier high-speed or high-radar-cross-section cases within the same dataset represent either measurement error or an attribution mistake, whereby a fast-moving object like a missile or aircraft momentarily conflated with a slower drone swarm in the same scene.
Better digital data is needed to decide whether any of the UAP orbs represent a new class of objects of non-human origin. Such data could be obtained through future campaigns for new data collection, coordinated by the partnership between the U.S. Government and the UAP Science Advisory Council (https://uapsac.com/) under my leadership.
Ler em Português